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The paper examines the impact of MiFID on stock price informativeness and liquidity in 28 EU
countries. We find that post-MiFID the stock prices reflect greater firm specific information and 
the market becomes more liquid. Consistent with the ‘Catch-up Hypothesis’ our evidence shows 
that the impact of MiFID in terms of price informativeness is greater for countries that have
weaker quality of regulation. We find that regulation with enforcement improves market 
efficiency. Our results are robust with respect to the choice of price informativeness and liquidity
proxies as well as the control sample.
Keywords: Capital markets; disclosure regulation; transaction costs; bid-ask spread; propensity
score matching.







    
  





   
   
  





     
  
 
                                                 
          
 
1. Introduction
The Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), enacted by European Union 
(EU) in 2004, has three pillars: transparency, investor protection, and competition. It aims to 
improve availability of information to the market participants and is arguably the most far-
reaching piece of legislation in the EU. In the words of Charlie McCreevy, the then European 
Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, “…MiFID as a whole is a ground-breaking
package of measures. It will transform the landscape for the trading of securities and introduce
much needed competition and efficiency throughout Europe’s financial markets.”1 Motivated by
its potentially significant impact on the European stock market, we seek to answer two questions. 
First, does the implementation of MiFID increase stock price informativeness? Second, does it
improve stock liquidity?
There are several reasons why the three pillars of MiFID would influence the stock price
informativeness and liquidity in the EU. The first pillar relates to improving trade transparency.
Greater transparency will reduce information asymmetry by improving the speed of information 
transmission, and cutting information acquisition costs, particularly for the less sophisticated 
market participants. Increased transparency would also provide valuable information to market 
participants about the trading strategies of other investors. Better access to the competitors’
trades will increase incorporation of firm-specific information, resulting in improved stock price
informativeness. The level-playing field created by the regulation would also increase market 
participation leading to improved liquidity. Investor protection is the second pillar of MiFID. To 
mitigate investor uncertainty MiFID requires investment firms to obtain ‘best execution’ of 










   
    
 
    
   
    









incoming market orders. Further, ‘order handling rules’ are designed to ensure that they are
executed promptly and sequentially. Since these provisions aim to protect investors, they will be
motivated to more actively participate in the market that will lead to greater price
informativeness and liquidity. The third pillar, increased competition, gives investors an
opportunity to trade at venues other than the organised stock exchanges. This will promote stiffer 
competition, consequently lowering the execution costs and increase stock price informativeness 
and market liquidity. 
Existing literature offers evidence of positive impact of regulatory reforms in the
financial markets on stock price informativeness and liquidity. Flood et al. (1999) provide 
evidence that greater disclosures narrow bid–ask spreads. Board and Sutcliffe (2000) show that 
on the London Stock Exchange, the reduction in trade reporting from 90 to 60 minutes leads to a
decline in effective spreads. Jin and Myers (2006) find that countries with greater transparency
have more informed stock prices. Further, Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) report implementation 
of insider trading regulation is associated with greater stock price informativeness. Zhao and 
Chung (2007) investigate the effect of implementing Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Rule 605 on the public disclosure of execution quality on the depth and spread of AMEX, NYSE 
and NASDAQ stocks and find evidence of improved liquidity. Boehmer et al. (2007) examine
the effect of monthly execution-quality disclosure on order-routing decisions and show that 
promoting public disclosure is associated with a reduction in execution costs. Cumming et al., 
(2011) and Christensen et al. (2016) report positive impact of stock exchange trading rules on 
transparency and liquidity.
However, greater transparency and increased competition can also adversely affect 







   
     
   
   
    
    
 
         
        
 
   
      




   
   
   
advantage of sophisticated investors, reduce their profits and disincentivise them from actively
trading in the market (Rindi, 2008; Boulatov and George, 2013). Second, increased competition 
may lead to fragmented markets and allow “cream-skimming” by informed investors
(Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997). Further, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) demonstrate that 
multiple trading venues lead to increased adverse selection costs. Thus, the contradictory
evidence of the impact of securities regulations on stock price informativeness and liquidity
demands a thorough investigation of MiFID’s impact on the EU stock markets.
Our study makes three important contributions. First, our paper makes a novel contribution 
to the literature that studies the nexus of securities regulation and stock price informativeness (e.g.,
Boehmer et al., 2005; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study to offer empirical evidence of the impact of MiFID regulation for the EU capital markets. 
More specifically, we contribute to this literature by showing that the implementation of the MiFID
regulation has economically benefited the EU capital markets in terms of a substantial increase in 
the informativeness of stock prices. This is in line with Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who suggest 
that improved transparency is associated with more informative stock prices. We show that
regulatory intervention that aims to improve investor protection and market competition can 
contribute positively to stock price informativeness.  
Second, our work supplements the stream of literature examining the relationship 
between stock market regulation and stock liquidity (e.g., Boehmer et al., 2005; Chung and 
Chuwonganant, 2009; Cumming et al., 2011, Christensen et al., 2016). Cumming et al. (2011)
investigate the effects of exchange trading rules and other wider regulations like MiFID. They
find that implementation of regulations improves liquidity. On the contrary, while examining







   
   
    
 
 
    
      
       
        
      
      
 
   
 
   
    
                                                 
                
           
 
Christensen et al. (2016) find no evidence that MiFID improves liquidity. Our research design is 
similar to Christensen et al. (2016). However, while MiFID is just a control variable in 
Christensen et al. (2016), our paper is significantly different as we provide evidence of MiFID’s 
impact on liquidity as well as stock price informativeness. Further, unlike Cumming et al. 
(2011), we use firm level data that is more insightful and provides a more robust evidence of 
MiFID’s impact in the EU. 2 Our results provide direct evidence of significant stock liquidity
benefits accruing from MiFID’s implementation in the EU and are consistent with the theoretical 
model of Easley and O’Hara (2009), which suggests that increased regulatory interventions in 
the financial market can generate significant benefits.  
Last but not the least, our paper contributes to the strand of literature on the influence of
legal convergence on capital markets across EU countries (e.g., Christensen et al., 2016). Extant 
literature suggests that the quality of existing regulations is associated with the capital-market
outcomes (e.g., Jackson and Roe, 2009; Cumming et al., 2018). We find that increase in price
informativeness and liquidity is significantly higher for countries that have weaker quality of
regulation. The findings imply that countries with weaker regulations benefit more in terms of
improved price informativeness and liquidity. 
We use monthly panel dataset with firm-level observations comprising 5,888 EU
incorporated firms that have publicly traded stocks over the period January 2006 to September 
2008. We employ a Difference-in-Differences (DID) research design (e.g., Fidrmuc and Hainz, 
2013; Dambra et al., 2015) with country, industry, and calendar-month fixed effects. We exploit 
2 There is an ongoing debate with regard to grouping of regulations and their impact on liquidity (See Cumming and











       
  
     
  
     
  
     
 
  
   
   
  






the staggered implementation of MiFID across the 28 EU countries that enables us to draw 
causal inferences and attenuates the effects of concurrent economic and institutional changes 
unrelated to the regulation (see, for example, Giroud, 2013; Christensen et al., 2016). Cumming
and Johan (2018) argue that since MiFID was adopted by most of the EU countries in our sample
at the same time, the staggered approach may not take into account the fall in liquidity caused by
the 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, to ensure robustness, we use a control sample by matching
each EU firm with a firm from the US or Canada. Our empirical results demonstrate that stock 
price informativeness improves significantly after the implementation of MiFID. In economic
terms, post-MiFID, price informativesness improves by 3 to 14 percentage points. We also find 
significant increase in liquidity with the bid-ask spread declining by 60 to 100 basis points post-
MiFID. Further, we show that MiFID’s impact on stock price informativeness and liquidity is 
greater for those EU countries that have weaker regulatory environment. The evidence is 
consistent with Cumming et al. (2015) in that we find the regulation with enforcement improves 
market efficiency. Notably, endogeneity arising from reverse causality is not a concern in our
study because MiFID was a part of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), an EU-wide
regulation. MiFID was not enacted in response to a specific event (see, Cumming et al., 2011).
Further, we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Difference and Differences (DID)
methods which are highly effective in mitigating endogeneity concerns (Roberts and Whited, 
2013). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of relevant 
MiFID provisions and the related literature. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methods. 






    
 
   
   






    
                                                 
           




   
   
2. The regulatory environment
The MiFID Directive, a key element of the FSAP, belongs to a group of four-part regulatory
reforms. The other three regulations are: the Prospectus Directive, the Market Abuse Directive, 
and the Transparency Directive. All these reforms relate to Level 1 framework of the Lamfalussy
process which was implemented from 2001 for a more effective regulation of the EU securities 
markets (Cumming and Johan, 2018).3 
Part 1, the Prospectus Directive aims to ensure that once a prospectus has been approved in 
one member state, it is valid to be used throughout the EU.4 The directive is intended to enhance
investor protection in the capital market through the production and issuance of a single high-
quality approved prospectus. 
Part 2, the Transparency Directive sets minimum mandatory disclosures of financial reports 
for all publicly listed companies within the EU. The main objective is to ensure transparency and 
eliminate adverse selection problem arising from information asymmetries between firms and 
investors in the capital market.5 
Part 3, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) aims to ensure that insider trading and market 
manipulation are eliminated. 6 It contains two key features: disclosure rules aimed at preventing
3 
See European Central Bank, The Governing Council Review of the Application of the Lamfalussy Framework to











    
   
  
  
    
 
   
   
   
      
 
     
    
                                                 
         
    
         
   
      
          
  
  
             
            
   
         
the informational advantage of insider and detecting market manipulation, and imposing
sanctions to dissuade insider dealing and market manipulation.7 
MiFID, passed by the EU legislature in April 2004 as regulatory harmonisation directive, 
concludes Part 4 of the Level 1 framework directive of Lamfalussy process.8 It aims to foster 
efficiency of trading services through fair competition and greater transparency in the EU capital 
markets. It also intends to increase the accessibility of markets and level the playing field 
between the informed and uninformed investors by narrowing the information gap.9 
To improve liquidity, market quality, and foster competition, MiFID abolishes the 
“concentration rule”.10 It fragments the markets into the regulated markets (RMs), the 
Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and the Systematic Internalisers (SIs).11 The RMs are the
traditional exchanges that bring together buyers and sellers in financial instruments through an 
order book or through dealers. The MTFs have similar trading functionalities to RMs but with
lower regulatory requirements. Under MiFID regime, the MTFs cannot route transactions to 
other exchanges that have better prices because they are not classified as broker-dealers. The
MTFs can be operated either by an operator of a RM or by an investment firm. The SIs are retail 
7 MiFID supports organizational agreements, real time computer survelliance, and enforces the implementation of
MAD (Cumming and Johan, 2008).
8 Directive 2004/39/EC replaces and repeals the 1993 Investment Services Directive (Directive 93/22/EEC or ISD)
in its entirety.
9 See European Commission, Directorate General Internal Market and Services, Financial Services Policy and
Financial Markets, Securities Markets, 8 December 2010, Public Consultation, Review of the Markets In Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2010/mifid/docs/consultation_paper_en.pdf
10 The “concentration rule" required that firms execute client orders only through the primary market. Its abolition
will lead to fragmentation of markets and increased competition between trading centres (e.g., Ferrarini and
Wymeersch, 2006; Aitken et al., 2017).





    
   
     
  
    
  
   
   
    
    
    
   





                                                 
   
  
market makers that internalise equity trades by executing client orders on their own account 
outside of a regulated market or MTF.12 
Additionally, MiFID improves transparency of the three-tiers of the market by enabling
the market participants to observe information during the trading process. For the pre-trade
transparency, articles 27, 29 and 44 of the directive require that current orders and quotes 
relating to shares should be available to the public in real time. Pre-trade information gives 
market participants the opportunity to monitor the conditions in the market at each price point for
all securities concurrently to help them make informed trading decisions. However, MTFs have a 
number of waivers available to them. For example, based on order size or market model, the
MTFs may only have to report executed trades.13 
Regarding post-trade transparency, articles 28, 30, and 45 of the Directive require all
market intermediaries to make public, details of executed trades as close to real time as possible
with the exception of deferment of the publication of large and block trades. Further, articles 19 
to 24 introduce the suitability requirements to ensure that investment and portfolio management 
firms act in the clients’ best interests. 
Further, MiFID aims to improve investor protection by requiring the investment firms to 
obtain “best execution”. In other words, the transaction should be the best possible result given 
the client’s stated investment objectives (Article 21). Further, Article 22 requires the investment 
firms to implement procedures to ensure prompt and sequential execution of orders. Article 31 
12 See Article 4(7)



















requires investment firms to classify investors as retail, professional, and eligible counterparties 
with varying degrees of protection (e.g., much higher level of protection for retail investors).
3. Hypotheses development
3.1. MiFID and the stock price informativeness
Increased transparency has a positive impact on information production and aggregation, 
which in turn influences the degree to which security prices incorporate firm-specific
information (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Glosten (1999) provides anecdotal evidence that 
greater market transparency increases commonality of information, leading to more efficient 
price discovery. Easley and O’Hara (2009) argue that regulatory interventions in the financial 
market can encourage wider participation by mitigating investor concerns regarding ambiguous 
information. La Blanc and Rachlinski (2005) argue that increased market participation will lead 
to higher stock price informativeness because every investor will bring new information to the 
market. Even the pure noise traders, will improve price accuracy by providing liquidity and an 
opportunity for the informed investors to trade.  Consistent with this view, Jin and Myers (2006)
show countries with greater transparency have more informative stock prices. Similarly, 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) document that implementation of insider trading regulation is 
associated with increased market transparency and price informativeness. As a consequence of 
reduced information asymmetry and higher liquidity, individual investors produce new 
information and improve stock price informativeness (Wang and Zhang (2015). Finally, 









     
   





       





    
 
On the contrary, improved transparency and lower transaction costs can reduce stock 
price informativeness as it attracts uninformed investors to the market. For example, Barber and 
Odean (2000), and Han and Kumar (2013) show that uninformed investors are influenced by
fads and psychological biases and distort the informational efficiency of the market. Similarly, 
Barber et al (2009) argue that since retail investors are largely noise traders, they increase market 
volatility thereby reducing the stock price informativeness. In addition, in a recent study, 
Banerjee et al. (2018) argue that due to complementarity in learning, greater transparency may be
counterproductive as it can make the information acquisition about other investors to be more
valuable and discourage learning about asset’s fundamentals, thus decreasing price
informativeness. 
Since the extant literature offers contradictory evidence regarding the impact of 
transparency related regulations on incorporation of firm specific information, MiFID’s impact 
on stock price informativeness is not clear-cut. Therefore our first null hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1. The implementation of MiFID will have no effect on stock price informativeness. 
3.2. MiFID and liquidity 
The existing evidence on the impact of disclosure related regulations on liquidity is
mixed. On one hand, research has shown that improved transparency lowers information 
acquisition costs (Hakansson (1977) and increases liquidity (Kyle, 1985). Existing evidence
suggests that transparency and fragmentation reduce transaction costs and increase trade
execution speed (O’Hara and Ye, 2011), enhance trading activity (He et al., 2014), lower 
volatility (Boneva et al., 2016), and reduce market breakups and breakdowns (Gao and Mizrach, 





   
  
    
   
 
 
     
   
   











reduction in transaction costs following the introduction of the NYSE OpenBook. Similarly, 
Chung and Chuwonganant (2009) show that the implementation of SuperMontage rule in the US 
leads to a decline in the bid-ask spreads and improvement in market liquidity. Zhao and Chung
(2007) investigate the impact of the Securities and Exchange (SEC) Rule 605 on market quality
and document a decline in spread and improvement in market quality, implying that greater
transparency reduces execution costs and improves liquidity. Cumming et al. (2011) examine the 
impact of stock exchange trading rules (including MiFID) on market liquidity. They find that 
MiFID regulations positively affect market liquidity.
On the other hand, greater transparency can lead to lower liquidity. Fishman and Hagerty
(1995) show that more disclosures can increase insiders’ profitability and widen non-insiders’
bid-ask spread. Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) show that regulations which fragment 
markets allow “cream skimming” by informed investors and reduce liquidity. Bloomfield and 
O’Hara (1999) find that trade disclosures not only increase information efficiency but also 
increase the spread, implying a reduction in the liquidity. In another study, Madhavan et al. 
(2005) show that greater transparency leads to higher execution costs and increased volatility. 
Further, Rindi (2008) argues that increased transparency reduces participation of informed 
investors and thereby adversely affects liquidity. Related literature on dark pools (e.g., Boulatov 
and George, 2013) also suggests that compared the displayed markets, hidden orders improve
liquidity and market quality. On the contrary, Gemmill (1996) and Saporta et al. (1999)
investigate the impact of changes in the data publication regime such as changed timing of 
reporting for large block trades on the London Stock Exchange, and find no change in liquidity.





     
  
   
 
    
  
   
   
    
  
  
    
    
  
    





    
 
Given the contrasting evidence, MiFID’s effect on liquidity is not a priori obvious and
hence we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2. Implementation of MiFID will have no effect on stock liquidity.
3.3. Existing Regulatory environment and the impact of MiFID
Enforcement theory of Djankov et al. (2003) suggests that the outcome of regulatory
intervention depends not only on the implementation of the new regulation but also on the
existing regulatory environment. There are two strands of literature which suggest that the effects 
of the regulatory change on stock informativeness and liquidity could be dissimilar across 
countries. First, the ‘catch-up’ literature (e.g. Abramovitz, 1986) suggests that the effect of a new 
regulation should be higher in countries with relatively weaker securities regulation because they
benefit from the backlog of pending regulatory policies. Further, in some countries their existing
regulations may not require significant changes while more substantial changes may be required 
in other countries. Cumming et al. (2011), for example, point out that regulations in the London 
stock exchange were already similar to those under MiFID while those on the Vienna stock 
exchange required significant updating. Second, the ‘hysteresis’ literature (e.g., Bhattacharya and 
Daouk, 2002; Christensen et al., 2016), suggests that market, political and institutional forces 
which hindered prior regulation can be counter-productive for implementation of new regulation. 
Since the magnitude of MiFID’s impact on price informativeness and liquidity could differ 
across countries depending on the quality of their existing regulations, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3. The quality of existing regulation will have no effect on the impact of MiFID on 








   
   
 
      
      
 
    
   
   
    
  




                                                 
            
           
 
4. Sample and measurement of key variables
4.1. Sample
Our initial sample comprises all domestically incorporated and listed firms in the EU
between 1st January 2006 and 30th September 2008. For the matched sample, we collect data for 
the listed US and Canadian firms over the same period. We use daily stock returns, end of the
day bid-offer spreads, intraday high and low prices, and turnover volumes. We convert all non-
Euro data in Euros using the end of day exchange rates. We collect monthly market values of 
equity, dividend yield and net income and convert all currency-denominated variables in Euros 
using the end of month exchange rates. The per capita GDP is converted using the end of quarter 
exchange rates. Indexes for measuring quality of regulation for countries included in our sample
are collected annually. Data is collected from Datastream and Bloomberg.14 
The sample period comprises 33 months and encompasses two sub-periods: the pre-
MiFID period from the first month of 2006 to the month in which MiFID is adopted, and the 
post-MiFID period from the month after MiFID’s adoption to the ninth month of 2008. To 
reduce the possible influence of small stocks, we follow Christensen et al. (2016) and exclude 
firms with an average equity market value of less than €4 million over the sample period. We
also require our sample firms to have at least 12 months observations as well as at least one 
observation in both the pre- and post-MiFID periods (e.g., Jones et al., 2016; Kausar et al., 
2016). Finally, we exclude all firms with missing industry classification code. Our final sample
14 
We use DataStream as a primary source of data. We supplement the bid-ask spread from Bloomberg for some





     





     
   
     
     
  
      
        
 
             
   
   
  
       
  
consists of 5,888 unique firms with 194,304 firm-months from the EU and 7,430 firms with 
245,190 firm-months from the US and Canada.  
4.2. Measurement of the variables  
Our empirical approach requires the measurement of stock price informativeness, and 
liquidity variables. In this subsection, we discuss the main variables used in our analyses. 
4.2.1. Measures of stock price informativeness 
To measure price informativeness, we use three different measures of price delay
suggested in Hou and Moskowitz (2005) and used in Phillips (2011), Busch and Obernberger 
(2016) and Jones et al. (2016). The measure uses market return as a proxy for new information 
and quantifies how average prices adjust to it. Therefore, in line with Busch and Obernberger 




𝑖ߚ + 𝑖ߙ =
0𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + ߝ𝑖,𝑡 (Base model) (1)
𝑖ߚ + 𝑖ߙ =5
0𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + ∑𝑛-1 ߜ𝑖
𝑛𝑅𝑚,𝑡,𝑛 + ߝ𝑖,𝑡 (Extended market model) (2)
herew 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return onݎon dayithe stock returns denotes𝑡,𝑖ݐ, day ,ݐ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡,𝑛 is the
market return n days prior to day ,n is the number of lag days ,ݐ and ߝ𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. As in 
Busch and Odernberger (2016), we use five lags of daily market returns to include all trading
days for each week.
Our first proxy for price delay (D1) is the R2 ratio that is calculated as one minus the ratio 









     







          
  
    
 
   
  
 
     





    
2𝑅𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐷1 = 1 , 2 (3)𝑅𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 
If new information was immediately impounded into a firm’s stock price, then R2 s from 
equation (1) and (2) will be similar and D1 will be close to zero. On the other hand, if there is 
delay in incorporation of information then R2 from equation 2 will be much higher compared R2 
from equation 1 and D1 will be closer to one.
The second price delay measure (D2), the Coefficient Ratio, is based on the ratio of the
lag-weighted sum of absolute coefficients of lagged market returns relative to the sum of 
absolute coefficients all the regression coefficients. Unlike D1 which gives equal weights to all
lags, D2 gives more weight to longer lags.
∑5 𝑛 × │𝛿𝑖
𝑛│
𝐷2 = 𝑛=1 5 𝑛│ 
(4)0│+ ∑│𝛽𝑖 𝑛=1 │𝛿𝑖 
The third delay measure (D3), the Standard Error Adjusted Coefficient Ratio, is based on 
the ratio of the lag-weighted sum of absolute coefficients of lagged market returns scaled by the 
coefficients’ standard error relative to the sum of absolute coefficients all the regression 
coefficients scaled by the standard error (se) of the coefficients. D3 gives more weight to more
precise estimates.
5 𝑛 𝑛∑ 𝑛 × │ 𝛿𝑖 │/ 𝑠𝑒(𝛿𝑖 )𝐷3 = 𝑛=1 (5)5 𝑛)│𝛽𝑖
0│/𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑖
0) + ∑ │𝛿𝑖
𝑛│/𝑠𝑒(𝛿𝑖𝑛=1 
Lower values of the delay proxies would indicate quicker incorporation of new 
information in stock prices. Since the three proxies are likely to capture similar fundamental 
construct, aggregation will reduce the measurement errors in the individual proxies and improve





        
  
  




    
   
    
   
   
  
    
 
  
   
    
  
  
                                                 
                
 
           
price delay measures to identify a more parsimonious measure of price informativeness.15 The
delay factor (DelayFac) extracted is also used as a dependent variable in the analyses.16 
4.2.2. Measures of liquidity and transaction costs 
We follow the literature and estimate stock (il)liquidity using five different proxies. The
first measure, Ln(1+Bid-Ask), is bid–ask spread commonly used in literature to capture
illiquidity (e.g., Cumming et al., 2011, Chung and Zhang, 2014, Christensen et al., 2016). It is 
defined as the difference between the daily closing bid and ask price divided by the average of 
bid and ask price. We use the natural log of 1 + the monthly average spread as a measure of 
illiquidity. Our second proxy, Ln(1+High-Low), is the high-low spread computed using two-day
interval high and low prices and then taking the natural log of 1 + the monthly average (see
Corwin and Schultz, 2012 for details). Schestag et al. (2016) shows that this is a better proxy of 
liquidity because it appropriately captures transaction costs. Our third proxy, Ln(1+Zeros), is 
defined as the natural log of 1 + the proportion of days with zero stock returns in a given month
(Lesmond et al., 1999). This proxy has been used as a measure of illiquidity in Christensen et al. 
(2016). Our fourth proxy, Ln(1+ILLIQ), is the illiquidity measure for price impact, defined as 
the natural log of 1 + the average of the absolute daily stock return divided by trading volume. 
This proxy first suggested by Amihud (2002) is one of the most widely used liquidity proxies in 
the literature. We multiply the ratio by one million for ease of interpretation. Finally, our fifth 
measure of liquidity, Ln(1+CHL), is the effective spread measure suggested in Abdi and Ranaldo 
(2017). It is defined as natural log of 1 + the monthly mean of daily Close, High, and Low 
15 The first factor has an eigenvalue of 1.50 and other two have eigenvalues of less than one, therefore, we only use 

the first factor. 








    
  
   
  
  









    
  
                                                 
              
       
             
      
(CHL) spread measure (see Appendix A for equation). We use this measure because it provides 
better estimate of transaction costs, especially for less liquid stocks. For all the proxies, a higher 
value corresponds to lower liquidity.
Since the five proxies capture similar liquidity characteristics, we once again use factor 
analysis and derive two composite liquidity proxies (LqFac1 and LqFac2) to reduce the
differences in the relative quality of the liquidity measures, minimize estimation errors, and 
ensure parsimony in our analysis.17 
4.3. The difference-in-differences approach
The DID approach requires a control sample that has not been affected by MiFID. We
use two approaches to identify the control sample. First, we take advantage of the staggered 
implementation of MiFID across the EU (see Table 1) and use the EU firms as their own control 
to isolate the causal effects on stock price informativeness and liquidity (see e.g., Giroud, 2013), 
and Leuz and Wysocki, 2016) for similar approach).18 Second, as there is limited variation in the
implementation dates across the EU countries, we use an alternative control sample of the US 
and Canadian firms. Our identification strategy assumes that the EU and the US and Canadian 
capital markets would have a high degree of homogeneity in the absence of MiFID introduction 
(the parallel trends assumption). Previous research argues that developed economies like, the US, 
Canada and the EU share many similar institutional arrangements (La Porta et al., 2006), are
subject to similar capital market regulations and environments (Bargeron et al., 2010), and 
17 We use first two factors because they have eigenvalues of 1.60 and 1.25 respectively. The other three factors have 

eigenvalues of less than 1.

18 Initially all firms are in the control group. However, they move to the treatment group when the country they belong
 










   
  
   
                  
                   
   




   





   
   
exposed to similar underlying economics (Gerakos et al., 2013). Further, existing literature has 
extensively used listed firms in the EU, Canada, and Australia as control sample for examining
the effects of Sarbanes Oxley, RegFD, and the JOBS Act (Bargeron et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2014; 
Dambra et al., 2015). 
4.4. Baseline specification and the difference-in-differences approach
We employ the DID specification in our analyses to examine MiFID’s impact on stock 
price informativeness and liquidity. Specifically, the basic regression models are: 
𝐷𝐿𝑖𝑡 =





where the dependent variable, 𝐷𝐿𝑖𝑡, is one of three measures of stock price informativeness or 
one of the five liquidity proxies for firm ℏ in month We use equation 6a for .ݐ the EU only
sample and equation 6b is for the matched sample. 1ߚ is the regression coefficient of our primary
variable of interest (MiFID in equation 6a and 𝐸𝑈 ∗ 𝑀ℏ𝐹𝐼𝐷 in equation 6b), and is a dummy
variable equal to one beginning from the month MiFID comes into force in a given EU member 
constitute several firm and country control 𝑡݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ𝐶otherwise. equal to zerostate and 
fixed effects to ensuremonthconstitute country, industry, and 𝑡ݏ𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐ݐ 𝐹ℏݔ𝑒𝑑variables. 
robustness to heteroscedasticity as well as to account for EU-wide heterogeneity, local shocks, 
and other common time-varying factors that may affect both stock markets and business cycle 
patterns. In 6b, similar to Kausar et al., (2016), we do not include EU and MiFID since EU is 
absorbed by country fixed effects MiFID by time fixed effects. We double-cluster standard errors 
along two dimensions; month and firm to adjust for heteroscedasticity as well as cross- and 








    
   
  
   
  
   
 







    
                                                 
                 
          
   
           
            
           
We control for firm-level variables that have been shown to affect stock price
informativeness and liquidity (Jin and Myers, 2006; Christensen et al., 2016). We control for the 
firm size (Ln_Mktcap), book-to-market ratio (BTM), natural logarithm of share turnover
(LnShare_turnover), log volatility of stock returns (LnRet_volat), dividend yield (DivYield), and 
returns (Ret).19 A loss indicator (Loss) equals to one if the net income before extraordinary items 
is negative in the last financial period and zero otherwise (Haw et al., 2012). The variable log
GDP per capita (LnGDPPerCAP) controls for the level of economic development that might 
affect the overall efficiency of the stock market.20 
We also include dummy variables to control for the effects of other regulatory
interventions that may influence our results, namely the Transparency Directive (TPD) and
Market Abuse Directive (MAD).21 The TPD aims to improve quality of public information 
through monitoring and enforcing compliance with financial reporting provisions whereas the 
MAD is concerned with preventing insider trading and market manipulation (see Christensen et 
al. (2016) for a survey). Except for the dummies, regulatory quality variables, and GDPPerCAP, 
we winsorize the variables at the top and bottom 2% level to reduce the influence of outliers. 
Detailed description of the variables is provided in Appendix A.
4.5. Propensity score matching (PSM)
A potential concern with using the firms from the US and Canada as control sample is 
selection bias due to the differences in the treatment and control groups of firms. To mitigate this
19 
Monthly stock returns (Ret) are the cumulative of the daily stock returns for the month. Following Griffin et al.
(2010), we delete single-day returns in excess of 200% to remove erroneous values.
20 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators
21 We do not control for financial crisis because it coincides with MiFID’s implementation. In any case, since the 
financial crisis affected all the EU countries as well as US and Canada, it is unlikely to influence our DID results.





   
  
   








   
  
  
   
 
 
                                                 
               
            
              




bias, we identify the control sample using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) of Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983). The PSM procedure removes observable differences between the treatment 
and control sample (Datta et al., 2015; Chan and Kwok, 2017; Shipman et al., 2017) enabling us 
to draw robust conclusions about the impact of changes due to implementation of MiFID. We
generate the propensity scores using the following logistic model:
𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 = +𝑖𝑡𝑎ݒ݋݈ݐ_𝑅𝑒ݐ𝐿݊3ߚ+𝑖𝑡ℏ𝑐𝑒𝑃ݎ𝐿݊2ߚ+𝑖𝑡ݐ݌𝑐𝑎𝑀݇_𝐿݊1ߚ0+ߚ 
𝑖𝑡ߝ+𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑒ߚ7 ݐ+𝑖𝑡𝑑݈𝐷ℏݒ𝑌ℏ𝑒 6ߚ+𝑖𝑡𝐵𝑇𝑀 5ߚ+𝑖𝑡ݒݎ𝑒ݑݐݎ݊݋_𝑒ݎ𝑎ℎ𝑆𝐿݊47) ߚ)
 
Where EUR is 1 for EU firms, 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. 
We match each treatment observation to a control observation in the pre-MiFID 
implementation period (January 2006 to the month before the implementation of MiFID) with 
the closest propensity score without replacement (1:1 matching), and within a 0.001 caliper 
distance to avoid bad matches.22 
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 presents the distribution of the number of firms and firm-month for each of the
countries in our sample. It shows the number of firms varies between 12 for Slovakia to 1700 for
the UK. Further, the UK contributes approximately 29% of the observations and the three largest 
22 
We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach. In a previous version, we matched
the firms based on propensity scores in both time periods (pre- and post- MiFID implementation) following the 
approach used in Bliss et al. (2018), Iselin and Nicoletti (2017) and Kyung et al. (2019). The results were 












   




   
  
    
  
   
  
  
                                                 
          
        
markets in the EU (UK, France, and Germany) together contribute 53% of the sample. Most EU
countries have implemented MiFID in November of 2007. 
[INSERT Table 1]
Table 2 presents the results of the propensity score matching (PSM) procedure and 
diagnostic tests for the covariate balance between treatment and control samples.  Panel A 
reports the logistic model estimates with robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
The significant coefficients in column (1) confirm that the treatment and control samples are
substantially different and show that matching firms on characteristics is appropriate. The p-
value of χ2 for overall model fitness is well below 0.001 indicating that our model significantly
explains variations in the choice attribute.
One of the key assumptions of the DID approach is that the treatment and control groups 
follow a parallel trend both, before and after the treatment (MiFID implementation in our case). 
Similar to Fang et al. (2014), we run two diagnostic tests to check the validity of the parallel 
trends assumption in our data. First, we re-run the Logistic model on the matched sample to test 
whether the PSM is successful in achieving balance for covariates. Our findings in column (2)
show that both groups have identical attributes in pre-MiFID period since the coefficients of the
independent variables are not significantly different from zero, and the χ 2s are statistically
insignificant.23 In addition, smaller coefficients of firm characteristics in column (2) suggest the 
insignificance of the coefficients is due to removal of cross-sectional differences between the 
23 Our results also show that while the industry dummies are statistically significant before the matching, they are 





   
  
     
 
 
   
 
  
   





       
   
    
   
  
  
   
treatment and control firms and not because of lower degrees of freedom due to smaller sample
size.
Second, panel B shows the distribution of propensity scores of the treatment and control 
groups is similar. In the pre-MiFID period, the maximum distance is only 0.001, and therefore
trivial. Overall, the evidence from both diagnostic tests suggests that the treatment and control 
firms have identical firm attributes before MiFID implementation.
[INSERT Table 2]
Table 3 Panel A presents the summary statistics. The mean (median) value of delay
measure (D1) obtained from Equation (3) is 0.561 (0.528), for D2 obtained from Equation (4) is 
1.876 (1.877), while the value for D3 obtained from Equation (5) is 1.794 (1.606). In general, 
this suggests that the proxies are not skewed. The mean (median) of Ln (1+Bid-Ask) is 0.047
(0.020) and for Ln(1+High-Low) it is 0.036 (0.000). The liquidity proxy, Ln(1+Zeros) suggests
that on average 17% of the total sample were non-trading days. It also reports the descriptive
statistics of the control variables. The mean (median) market value is €1,245 (€76) million before
logarithmic transformation, suggesting the firm size is highly skewed. As is apparent, the mean 
(median) monthly returns are -0.5% (-0.2%). About 23 percent of sample firm observations made
a loss during these periods. The average stock has a dividend yield of 1.9% but the mean is 
biased upwards by several high dividend yield stocks, reflected by the median value of 0.5%.
Panel B also provide summary statistics for the matched sample in the pre-MiFID period. The
results of the univariate comparisons of the means of each of the matched control variables
(column 13) show that the treatment and control samples are similar across variables that 





    
   
    





    
    
     





    
    
  
normalized differences in column (14). The normalized differences are calculated as the 
difference in average for treatment and control sample divided by the square root of the mean of 
the sample variances. The normalized differences are below the threshold of 0.25 (as suggested 
by Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), further confirming the differences in the covariates between 
the two samples are insignificant. Collectively, the results suggest that the covariates are
generally balanced across the matched sample.
[INSERT Table 3]
We examine the correlation for all variables (not tabulated here for brevity but available 
on request). None of the independent variables show high correlations suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a concern. For the price delay proxies (dependant variable), two of the 
three delay measures show high correlations. All liquidity proxies show low correlations with the
exception of the correlation between Bid-Ask spread and Amihud’s illquidity factor (0.52). We
conduct Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for stock price delay and liquidity proxies for
parsimony. DelayFac, which is the only component (with eigenvalue > 1) of the PCA of the price
delay proxies is highly correlated (80 percent and above) with D2 and D3 showing it captures the 
information in these two proxies. The liquidity PCA gives two components with eigenvalue > 1 
(LqFac1 and LqFac2) suggesting they capture different dimensions of the information in 
individual proxies.
5.2. MiFID and the stock price informativeness
In this section, we examine the effects of the adoption of the MiFID directive on stock 





     
    
    
      
       
 
   
   
     
    
  
   
    
   
  
    
  
   
     
 
 
   
the regression in equation (6). Panel A reports the results of each of the three proxies and the 
aggregate measure for the EU only firms whereas Panel B presents the results for the matched 
sample. The results reported in Panel A show that all specifications yield similar results i.e., the
coefficient estimates of MiFID are significantly negative at the 5% level or better, indicating that 
the adoption of MiFID is associated with decrease in price delay and increase price
informativeness. As our specification contains industry, country, and month fixed effects, and 
standard error double-clustered by month and firm level, the effect of MiFID appears to be
economically significant. Column (1) shows that, in economic terms, a change in capital market 
regulation from 0 to 1 reduces Delay by 7.0 percent (=-0.039/0.561, where 0.561 is the mean 
delay (D1) obtained from Panel A of Table 3). In the spirit of these results, we also test whether 
the parsimonious measure of price delay (DelayFac) provides similar reduction in delay post-
MiFID. Again, the result is qualitatively similar (see column (4) of Table 4) to the models 
estimated using the aggregate delay proxies. The coefficient estimate on MiFID in column (4) is
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, and it is higher when compared to columns
(1) to (3). This finding indicates that: (i) price delay decreases after the adoption of MiFID; and 
(ii) the parsimonious measure of price informativeness also shows improvement. The results 
reveal that the adjusted R2 is higher for column (4) relative to columns (1) to (3) in Panels A of 
Table 4, indicating that the DelayFac model specification in column (4) has greater explanatory
power compared to the other specifications. Another plausible explanation could indicate that the
variables D1, D2 and D3 are more noisy proxies of price delay and, therefore, may introduce
attenuation bias, which likely understate our coefficient estimates. Our evidence is consistent 
with Cook and Tang (2010) who provide similar results regarding the impact of Regulation FD 





   
   
      
    
 
  
   
     
  
   
       
      
       
 
    
  
 
     
  
   
  
   
     
Next, we test the robustness of our results by using alternative control sample of the US 
and Canadian firms using the propensity score matching while retaining country, industry, and 
month fixed effects included in Panel A. We also double-cluster standard errors by month as well
as by firm. The results presented in Panel B are qualitatively similar to those in Panel A. The
coefficients for the primary variable of interest (EU*MiFID) in column (1) is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level (β=-0.07, t=-4.25), confirming our previous finding that 
MiFID is associated with higher informational efficiency of prices. The magnitude of the effects 
of the other price delay and aggregate measures in columns (2) to (4) are qualitatively similar to 
that of Panel A. The coefficient estimates on EU*MiFID are all negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level or better, suggesting reduction in price delay after the implementation 
of the directive. From an economic perspective, our result in column (1) shows that relative to 
the pre-MiFID, price informativeness increases by 9.7 percent (in terms of mean firm-specific
return variation (=-0.065/0.672, where 0.672 is the average of delay obtained in Panel B of Table
3). Similarly, in column (2), a change in capital market regulation from 0 to 1 is associated with 
a decrease in price delay by 5.5 percent. 
Finally, our results are generally consistent with regard to significance of the control 
variables. For example, the coefficient for market capitalization (Ln_Mktcap) is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all eight model specifications (Panels A and B)
indicating that larger firms have more informative stock prices (e.g., Hou and Moskowitz, 2005;
Phillips, 2011). In addition, we observe in five of the eight specifications, delay increases and 
price informativeness decreases with higher stock return volatility (e.g., see Phillips, 2011; Hou 
and Moskowitz, 2005). BTM is negative and statistically significant in EU only sample but not





   
 





    
 
   
       
    
   




    
    
       
                                                 
    
delay and increases price informativeness. The coefficient estimate of TPD is significant in half 
of the model specifications, indicating that TPD is likely to increase price informativeness.  The
coefficient estimate of MAD is positive and significant in only half of the model specifications, 
which suggests that the MAD regulation has had limited impact in our sample. In summary, the
evidence in Table 4 rejects our hypothesis (H1) and suggests that post-MiFID, stock market 
price informativeness of EU firms has improved.
[INSERT Table 4]
5.3. MiFID and liquidity 
In this section, we investigate whether the adoption of MiFID affects transaction costs
and liquidity by estimating the following regression model in equation (6) with liquidity proxies 
as dependent variable. 24 Standard errors are double-clustered by month and firm dimensions. 
In Panel A of Table 5, we report the regression results for the EU only firms. In terms of 
our key variable of interest (MiFID), the estimates are statistically significant at the 10 percent
level or better and exhibit negative sign in all specifications. The evidence suggests a significant 
reduction in transaction costs and improvement in market liquidity post-MiFID. More
specifically, column 1 reports the impact of MiFID on the bid-ask spread. The result indicates 
that MiFID has a negative and statistically significant effect on the bid-ask spread (β=-0.006, t= -
3.47). In economic terms, the adoption of MiFID lowers bid-ask spread by 60 basis points (=e -
0.006 -1) for the EU firms, indicating an increase in liquidity. Since the pre-MiFID mean is 4.5
percent, this represents a reduction of 13 percent in average spread. Similarly, using the close, 





   
    
 
  





     
   
  
 
   
   
  
      
     
   
                                                 
         
high, low spread as the dependent variable in column (5), liquidity improves by 1 basis point (=e-
0.001 -1). Since the pre-MiFID average is 0.50 percent, it suggests a reduction of spread by 20
percent. 
For robustness, we repeat our analysis with the matched sample. From results in panel B, 
we find that MiFID’s impact (EU*MiFID) is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent or 
better in six of the seven specifications. The results are qualitatively similar to those in panel A 
and suggest that MiFID lowers transaction costs and improves liquidity. Specifically, in column 
1, the coefficient estimate for the key variable of interest (EU*MiFID) is negative and strongly
significant (β=-0.010, t= -3.95). The effect is economically large because average spread 
-0.010 declines by 100 basis points (=e -1) or by 24.4 percent relative to matched control firms. 
Overall, the empirical evidence strongly rejects our null hypothesis (H2) and suggests that the 
MiFID directive has reduced trading costs and improved market liquidity. 
[INSERT Table 5]
5.4 Falsification tests
To further confirm the validity of our identification strategy, we conduct falsification 
tests by rerunning the analyses with lag-term implementation period.25 In particular, we create 
three random hypothetical dummies, 1 month before (EU*MiFID -1), 3 months before
(EU*MiFID -3), and 6 months before (EU*MiFID -6) that indicate months before the adoption of
MiFID. To satisfy the parallel trend assumption, the coefficient estimates of the lag terms should 
be insignificant (e.g., see Kausar et al., 2016).













    
   
 
    
                                                 
             
 
                
       
        
          
      
           
             
           
       
           
                 
In Table 6, we report the results with one delay measure (D1) and one liquidity measure
(Ln(1+Bid-Ask)).26 For brevity, we only tabulate the coefficient estimates and t-statistics of the
key variables of interest. We note that only one of the coefficient estimates of EU*MiFID -1, 
EU*MiFID -3, and EU*MiFID -6 are statistically different from zero. Thus, the findings lend 
further support to the validity of the parallel trends assumption underlying our analysis. 
[INSERT Table 6]
5.5. Regulatory quality and the impact of MiFID 
Our analyses so far show that the implementation of MiFID is associated with increased 
stock price informativeness and liquidity. In this section, we investigate whether the 
heterogeneity in the regulatory quality among countries has any effect on MiFID’s impact on 
stock price information and liquidity. Thus, to assess the quality of regulation (QltyReg) of the
EU countries in our sample, we use three institutional proxies: World Bank Regulatory quality
index (Estimate of Governance), World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness indexes 
(Strength of Investor Protection index, and Trustworthiness & Confidence index).27 In Table 7, 
we present the 2006 and 2008 scores for each of the three regulatory quality indexes. 
26 Results using other proxies of stock price informativeness and liquidity are qualitatively similar and available on
request.
27 
The Regulatory Quality index was first developed by Kaufmann et al. (2004) and is updated and maintained in
the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators database. It captures governments’ ability to implement 
policies that promote private sector development. As Christensen et al. (2016) highlight, this indicator generally
captures the benefit of past regulation (both in the capital markets and other areas). The Investor Protection index
assesses the influence of country-level governance safeguards that permit and promote private sector development. 
It is composed of the Extent of Disclosure Index, the Extent of Director Liability Index and the Ease of Shareholder
Suits Index and can be regarded as the main measure of investor protection regulations (Haidar, 2009). It is part of
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness index dataset found in the World Bank's Doing Business Reports.
The Financial Market Development (Trustworthiness and Confidence) index originates from the World Economic 
Forum Global Competitiveness index. It measures the efficiency of supervision and regulation of stock exchanges as







   
 
  
    
                   
       
      







     
     
[INSERT Table 7]
To shed more light on the catch-up process for countries with weaker securities 
regulation, we use the time series of these proxies. We test our hypothesis 3 about the differential 
impact of the quality of pre-existing regulation on the impact of MiFID on price informativeness 
and liquidity using the following model:
𝐷𝐿𝑖𝑡 = +𝑡݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ𝐶ߛ+𝑀ℏ𝐹𝐼𝐷∗𝐸𝑈∗ 𝜆ݕݐ𝑅𝑒𝑔݈𝑄3ߚ+𝜆ݕݐ𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑄݈2ߚ+𝑀ℏ𝐹𝐼𝐷∗𝐸𝑈1ߚ0+ߚ 
𝑖𝑡ߝ+𝑚ݏ𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐ݐ 𝐹ℏݔ𝑒𝑑𝑚8) ∑ߚ)
 
where 𝐷𝐿𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variables, QltyReg𝜆 is the index value or set to 1 for countries with 
high past regulatory quality. Our main variable of interest is the regression coefficient, 3ߚ, which 
captures the incremental effect of QltyReg*EU*MiFID on price delay or liquidity proxies. All 
other variables are the same as defined in equation (6). Our approach is, in principle, similar to 
that of Cumming et al. (2011) who create indexes based on specific rules on 42 stock exchanges 
over time in order to capture the effect of changes in regulation.
To the extent that MiFID improves the quality of regulation and also accelerates the
catch-up process by providing a level-playing field across the capital markets in the EU, the
coefficient of QltyReg for member states with weaker securities regulation are likely to be higher 
than those with stronger securities regulation. Thus, higher values of the coefficient of the
interaction term (3ߚ) would indicate that EU countries with past weaker regulation are catching-
up with countries with stronger regulation.
Table 8 reports the regression results for stock price informativeness. For brevity, we






    
      
    




     
  
   
 
  
     
     
   
    
   
  
    
                                                 
       
coefficients on MiFID are significantly negative for all but one model specifications, indicating
that adoption of the MiFID directive increases stock price informativeness. In column (1) of 
Panel A, the coefficient on the main variable of interest, QltyReg*EU*MiFID, is significantly
positive (β=0.322, t=3.53), suggesting that price delay benefits of MiFID are stronger in
countries where the regulatory quality is weaker. Columns (2) and (3) show a similar impact as 
captured by the Strength of Investor Protection index, and Trustworthiness and Confidence
index. Panel B presents results for the matched sample, the evidence is qualitatively similar to 
panel A. We also analyse MiFID’s impact using individual price informativeness proxies (not 
tabulated here for brevity) and find similar results. Collectively, these results suggest that 
MiFID’s impact on stock price informativeness is higher for countries that have weaker
regulatory quality. This leads us to reject our null hypothesis H3 with regard to the differential 
impact of MiFID on price informativeness.
[INSERT Table 8]
Next, using the same empirical approached as in Table 8, we examine the differential 
impact of MiFID on liquidity using the two factors (LqFac1 and LqFac2) obtained from the 
PCA. Panel A of Table 9 reports results for EU only countries and Panel B for the matched 
sample. Our results reveal that the estimated coefficients on MiFID are negative and statistically
significant in all twelve model specifications (in panels A and B), suggesting that liquidity
improves post-MiFID. For our primary variable of interest (QltyReg *EU*MiFID), using
LqFac1 as the proxy for liquidity, the evidence shows that countries with low quality of 
regulation show a greater improvement in liquidity post-MiFID.28 The results LqFac2 are similar 









   





   
 
    
       
   
 
       
   
  
  
   
with five of the six coefficients are positive with four being statistically significant. We therefore




MiFID aims to enhance investor protection, competition and access to information in the
EU capital markets. We make important contributions to the literature on the consequences of 
disclosure related regulations by providing a robust evidence of the MiFID’s effect on stock 
price informativeness. We also complement the evidence of MiFID’s impact on stock market 
liquidity provided in a small number of related studies. Further, we show that the quality of past 
regulation has a significant influence on the improvements in price informativeness and liquidity
following the implementation of MiFID.
Our results show that disclosure regulations such as MiFID can provide significant 
economic benefits through easier and cheaper access to information. We find that post-MiFID, 
the price informativeness significantly improves by 3 to 14 percent. Using stock level data, our 
results support the previous finding reported by Cumming et al. (2011) which shows that 
liquidity improves following the implementation of MiFID. We find that the execution costs
proxied by the bid-ask spread decline by 60 to 100 basis points. We also present evidence that 
increase in price informativeness and liquidity is significantly higher for countries that have
weaker quality of regulation. This evidence is consistent with the ‘Catch-up Hypothesis’ which 









From a broader perspective, our evidence suggests that securities regulations with 
enforcement which promote transparency, improve investor protection and increase stock market 





      
  
   
 
  








     




    
 
   
   
   
  
 
    
   
   
  
 
   
  
   
  
    
    
   
 
   
   
 


















Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of equity and the monthly
market value of equity.
Delay (D1), is calculated as one minus the ratio of the R-Square of the
base regression (equation 1) to the R-Square of the extended regression
(equation 2).
Delay (D2) is the ratio of the lag-weighted sum of absolute coefficients 
of lagged market returns relative to the sum of absolute coefficients all
the regression coefficients as in equation (4).
Delay (D3) is the ratio of the lag-weighted sum of absolute coefficients 
of lagged market returns scaled by the coefficients’ standard error 
relative to the sum of absolute coefficients all the regression coefficients 

scaled by the standard error of the coefficients as in equation (5). All 

price delay measures have been calculated over one month.
 
DelayFac is an aggregate Delay measure and represents the scores of a
 








Defined as the natural log of one plus the monthly mean of the daily
 




Natural log of one plus the monthly mean of daily High-Low measure
 
(see Corwin and Schultz (2012) for details on the estimation). 

Natural log of one plus the proportion of trading days with zero daily
 




Computed as the natural log of one plus the monthly average of the
 
daily absolute value of stock return divided by the euro trading volume, 

multiplied by one million. 

Natural log of one plus the monthly mean of daily Close, High, and 

Low (CHL) spread measure: 𝐶𝐻𝐿 = √𝐸[(𝑐𝑡 , 𝜂)(𝑐𝑡 , 𝜂𝑡+1)
	
Where c is the daily close log-price and 𝜂 is midpoint of daily high and 

low log-prices (see Abdi and Ranaldo, 2017). 

Natural log of stock price times the number of shares outstanding
 
measured at the end of the month (in millions of euros).
 
Natural log of quarterly Gross Domestic Product Per Capita.

Natural log of the monthly mean of the daily turnover (i.e., trading
 




Natural log of stock price at the end of the month.
 










     
 






   
    
  




   
   
 
  
   
  
   









Loss A dummy variable that equals one if the net income before
extraordinary items is negative in the last financial period and zero 
otherwise.
LqFac1 The liquidity factor is an aggregate liquidity measure and represents the
first factor obtained from the PCA with the five liquidity variables.
LqFac2 The liquidity factor is an aggregate liquidity measure and represents the 
second factor obtained from the PCA with the five liquidity variables.
MAD A dummy variable equal to one for periods after the implementation of 
the Market Abuse Directive.
MiFID A dummy variable equal to one for periods after the implementation of 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive.
Regulatory Quality Measures ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. Lower scores represent lower regulatory quality. The
index was first developed by Kaufmann et al. (2004) and is updated. 
Sourced from World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators
database.
Strength of Investor An index aggregating the Extent of Disclosure Index, the Extent of
Protection Director Liability Index and the Ease of Shareholder Suits Index. Lower 
scores represent lower investor protection. Sourced from World 
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness index dataset in the World 
Bank's Doing Business database. 
TPD A dummy variable equal to one for periods after the implementation of 
the Transparency Directive.
Ret Ret is the continuously compounded monthly stock return. Single-day
returns in excess of 200% are deleted to remove erroneous values 
(Griffin et al., 2010)
Trustworthiness & Measures the effective regulation and supervision of the financial 
Confidence market to protect investors. Sourced from World Economic Forum 
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Table 1: Sample composition and entry-into-force dates of MiFID
MiFID entry-into-force
Country Unique Firms Firm-Months
Dates*
Austria 94 3,102 November, 2007
Belgium 143 4,719 November, 2007
Bulgaria 16 528 November, 2007
Cyprus 89 2,937 November, 2007
Czech Republic 15 495 July, 2008
Denmark 178 5,874 November, 2007
Estonia 15 495 November, 2007
Finland 131 4,323 November, 2007
France 810 26,730 November, 2007
Germany 622 20,526 November, 2007
Greece 245 8,085 November, 2007
Hungary 32 1,056 December, 2008
Ireland 41 1,353 November, 2007
Italy 272 8,976 November, 2007
Latvia 13 429 May, 2007
Lithuania 40 1,320 November, 2007
Luxembourg 15 495 November, 2007
Malta 13 429 November, 2007
Netherlands 119 3,927 November, 2007
Norway 214 7,062 November, 2007
Poland 277 9,141 May, 2008
Portugal 51 1,683 November, 2007
Romania 148 4,884 February, 2007
Slovakia 12 396 November, 2007
Slovenia 50 1,650 August, 2007
Spain 151 4,983 February, 2008
Sweden 382 12,606 November, 2007
United Kingdom 1,700 56,100 November, 2007
5,888 194,304
Additional control sample
Canada 1,573 51,909 N/A
United States 5,857 193,281 N/A
7,430 245,190
Total 13,318 439,494










      
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
       
 
        
        
        
        









Table 2: Propensity score matching
Panel A: Logistic Regression
Column (1) (2)

















Number of observations 295,136 163,674
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.001
p-value of χ2 <0.001 0.689
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Panel B: Estimated Propensity Score Distributions
Pre-MiFID
Propensity Scores No of Obs. Min P25 P50 P75 Max STD
Treatment 81,837 0.025 0.276 0.483 0.567 0.940 0.183
Control 81,837 0.024 0.275 0.483 0.565 0.934 0.183
Difference - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Panel A presents logistic regression estimates. The dependant variable is 1 if it is an EU firm and 0 
otherwise. Column (1) reports the Pre-match coefficient estimates across sample period from
January 2006 to period prior MiFID implementation while column (2) reports the post-match 
coefficients for the same period. The z-statistics are in brackets. All variables are defined in 
appendix A. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust standard errors 









       
     
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
        
       
       
       
 
   
   
        
       
        
       
       
       
       
       
Table 3: Summary statistics
Panel A: EU Firms only
N Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std. Dev.
Dependent variables:
Price Delay proxies:
D1 169,414 0.361 0.561 0.528 0.814 0.268
D2 169,414 1.545 1.876 1.877 2.224 0.522
D3 169,414 1.150 1.794 1.606 2.319 0.848
DelayFac 167,336 -0.907 0.000 -0.137 0.925 1.000
Liquidity proxies:
Ln(1+Bid-Ask) 163,703 0.007 0.047 0.020 0.051 0.075
Ln(1+High-Low) 183,805 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.073 0.114
Ln(1+Zeros) 172,618 0.000 0.170 0.095 0.268 0.195
Ln(1+ ILLIQ) 175,002 0.004 0.383 0.052 0.348 0.768
Ln(1+CHL) 191,367 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.006
LqFac1 160,920 -0.755 0.000 -0.455 0.221 1.000
LqFac2 160,920 -0.663 0.000 -0.134 0.526 1.000
Independent variables:
Market value (€'M) 191,367 21 1,245 76 407 4,419
LnRet_volat 179,236 -4.348 -3.929 -3.892 -3.457 0.749
Ret 191,367 -0.058 -0.005 -0.002 0.045 0.122
LnShare_turnover 174,075 -8.303 -7.134 -6.966 -5.753 1.911
BTM 174,962 0.282 0.622 0.488 0.800 0.588
LnGDPPerCaP 191,367 8.893 8.841 8.934 8.974 0.480
Loss 191,367 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.420





      
      
      
 







                
       
     
  
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                 
                
                
               
                   
               
           








Panel B: Treatment and control groups matched sample (Pre-MiFID)
Treatment Control
Std. Std. Diff. in Norm.
N Q1 Mean Median Q3 Dev. N Q1 Mean Median Q3 Dev. Mean Difference
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Dependent variables:
D1 70,980 0.472 0.672 0.743 0.909 0.268 72,440 0.429 0.645 0.705 0.896 0.276 0.027***
D2 81,300 1.682 2.003 1.987 2.316 0.465 81,582 1.651 1.995 1.978 2.327 0.485 0.008***
D3 81,300 1.570 2.075 2.058 2.556 0.680 81,582 1.745 2.192 2.179 2.623 0.615 -0.117***
DelayFac 70,517 -0.670 0.070 0.040 0.773 1.002 72,212 -0.535 0.172 0.135 0.848 0.967 -0.103***
Ln(1+Bid-Ask) 65,554 0.006 0.031 0.014 0.034 0.049 66,312 0.001 0.029 0.007 0.031 0.054 0.002***
Ln(1+High-Low) 80,054 0.018 0.064 0.069 0.111 0.187 80,332 0.048 0.114 0.081 0.146 0.227 -0.049***
Ln(1+Zeros) 81,837 0.000 0.154 0.087 0.223 0.184 81,837 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.113***
Ln(1+ ILLIQ) 81,814 0.002 0.288 0.027 0.202 0.672 81,794 0.000 0.407 0.022 0.305 0.863 -0.119***
Ln(1+CHL) 66,343 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.005 64,251 0.005 0.011 0.008 0.014 0.010 -0.005***
LqFac1 60,857 -0.503 -0.118 -0.454 -0.178 0.835 61,026 -0.508 0.009 -0.459 -0.076 1.051 -0.127***
LqFac2 60,857 -0.372 -0.146 -0.136 0.062 0.840 61,026 -0.224 0.116 -0.050 0.310 1.068 -0.262***
Independent variables:
Ln_Mktcap 81,837 3.301 4.913 4.620 6.323 2.110 81,837 3.319 4.902 4.639 6.330 2.120 0.011 -0.06
LnRet_volat 81,837 -4.185 -3.803 -3.830 -3.294 0.587 81,837 -4.190 -3.801 -3.835 -3.305 0.751 -0.002 0.04
LnPrice 81,837 0.893 1.963 2.020 3.020 1.779 81,837 0.901 1.954 2.028 3.023 1.913 0.009 0.08
Ret 81,837 -0.049 0.002 0.001 0.067 0.236 81,837 -0.055 -0.001 -0.001 0.061 0.480 0.003 0.05
LnShare_turnover 81,837 -7.629 -6.692 -6.507 -5.408 1.878 81,837 -7.630 -6.694 -6.504 -5.412 2.156 0.002 -0.05
BTM 81,837 0.206 0.581 0.439 0.690 2.345 81,837 0.214 0.585 0.436 0.684 4.374 -0.004 0.03
DivYield (%) 81,837 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.022 0.025 81,837 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.018 0.033 -0.001 -0.02
LnGDPPerCaP 81,837 8.866 8.834 8.934 8.991 0.494 81,837 9.104 9.136 9.138 9.175 0.078 -0.302*** -0.21
Loss 81,837 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.421 81,837 0.000 0.298 0.000 1.000 0.477 0.072** 0.16
Panel A presents the summary statistics for the EU firms. Panel B presents the summary statistics for matched treatment and control sample along with the 
difference in means between two groups tested for significance using a two-tailed t-test. The price delay factor (DelayFac) is the aggregation of the three
delay measures using principal component analysis with varimax rotation. LqFac1 and LqFac2 are the first two components obtained from the PCA of the 
five liquidity proxies. All variables (except DelayFac, LqFac1, LqFac2, LnGDPPerCAP and dummy variable) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 








      
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
      
     
   
      
  
   
    
 







Table 4: Effect of MiFID on Stock price informativeness
Panel A: EU only sample
D1 D2 D3 DelayFac
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
MiFID -0.039*** -0.059** -0.170** -0.262***
[-3.26] [-2.29] [-2.59] [-3.31]
Ln_Mktcap -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.118*** -0.161***
[-19.12] [-16.51] [-34.11] [-36.49]
LnRet_volat 0.019*** 0.205*** 0.066*** 0.177***
[4.26] [30.65] [3.18] [6.45]
Ret 0.041*** 0.249*** 0.256*** 0.394***
[3.57] [5.48] [3.37] [6.45]
LnShare_turnover -0.002* 0.020*** -0.027*** -0.022***
[-2.03] [13.66] [-4.46] [-3.05]
BTM -0.007*** -0.003 -0.015* -0.034***
[-3.20] [-0.49] [-1.79] [-2.78]
LnGDPPerCAP -0.007 -0.159 0.071 0.003
[-0.05] [-0.86] [0.10] [0.00]
Loss -0.005 0.040*** -0.044*** -0.036**
[-1.55] [9.74] [-4.14] [-2.42]
DivYield -0.357*** -0.002 -0.663** -1.537***
[-4.20] [-0.02] [-2.22] [-3.32]
TPD -0.029*** -0.002 -0.100** -0.161***
[-3.34] [-0.24] [-2.36] [-2.79]
MAD 0.021 0.056** 0.071 0.124
[0.63] [2.65] [0.28] [1.25]
Number of observations 146,405 156,182 155,685 145,972
Adj. R-squared (%) 22.9 27.3 30.7 33.0
Effects on Delays (%) 7.0 3.1 9.5 14.0
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the effects of MiFID on stock price informativeness. The dependent variables are the 
proxies for price delay. All the variables are as defined in appendix A. The regressions include (but are
not reported here) a constant term. Standard errors are double-clustered by month and firm and are 
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. All variables (except DelayFac, LnGDPPerCAP and 
dummy variable) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The sample period is from January
2006 to September 2008. The t-statistics are reported in brackets below their coefficient estimates. ***, 







      
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
    
     
     
     
     
     
   












Panel B: Matched sample
D1 D2 D3 DelayFac
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
EU*MiFID -0.065*** -0.111** -0.256*** -0.236***
[-4.25] [-2.70] [-4.42] [-4.42]
Ln_Mktcap -0.029*** -0.072*** -0.107*** -0.098***
[-5.10] [-9.09] [-5.05] [-5.05]
LnRet_volat -0.034*** 0.123*** -0.127*** -0.117***
[-5.38] [9.57] [-5.35] [-5.35]
Ret 0.042* 0.184*** 0.156* 0.144*
[1.81] [4.22] [1.81] [1.81]
LnShare_turnover -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.040*** -0.037***
[-5.43] [-3.59] [-5.45] [-5.45]
BTM 0.003* -0.006 0.009 0.008
[1.70] [-1.62] [1.56] [1.56]
LnGDPPerCAP -0.321*** -0.416 -1.183*** -1.091***
[-2.82] [-1.56] [-2.75] [-2.75]
Loss -0.001 0.048*** -0.005 -0.005
[-0.51] [6.43] [-0.52] [-0.52]
DivYield -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.040*** -0.037***
[-6.23] [-6.60] [-6.07] [-6.07]
TPD 0.020** 0.019 0.069* 0.064*
[2.05] [0.84] [1.95] [1.95]
MAD 0.110*** 0.071* 0.422*** 0.389***
[5.29] [1.86] [5.28] [5.28]
Number of observations
258,969 257,080 256,441 256,441
Adj. R-squared (%) 12.0 22.1 12.0 12.0
Effects on Delays (%) 9.7 5.5 12.3 11.4
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the effects of MiFID on stock price informativeness. The dependent variables are the 
proxies for price delay. All the variables are as defined in appendix A. The regressions include (but are
not reported here) a constant term. Standard errors are double-clustered by month and firm and are robust
to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. All variables (except DelayFac, LnGDPPerCAP and dummy
variable) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The sample period is from January 2006 to 
September 2008.The t-statistics are reported in brackets below their coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * 







        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
         
        
        
   
  
  
   
 





Table 5: Effect of MiFID on liquidity
Panel A: EU only sample
Ln(1+High-
Ln(1+Bid-Ask) Low) Ln(1+Zeros) Ln(1+ILLIQ) Ln(1+CHL) LqFac1 LqFac2
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MiFID -0.006*** -0.010** -0.013* -0.093** -0.001* -0.151*** -0.121**
[-3.47] [-1.82] [-1.87] [-2.15] [-1.85] [-2.74] [-2.12]
Ln_Mktcap -0.012*** 0.004*** -0.008*** -0.113*** 0.000* -0.235*** 0.026***
[-23.34] [7.13] [-6.95] [-24.16] [-1.88] [-29.24] [5.13]
LnRet_volat 0.010*** 0.020*** -0.001 0.110*** 0.001*** 0.208*** 0.321***
[11.60] [12.98] [-0.49] [13.48] [18.82] [15.05] [16.40]
Ret 0.020*** -0.003 -0.007 0.200*** 0.001*** 0.317*** 0.160***
[4.26] [-0.46] [-1.12] [5.28] [3.43] [4.69] [2.89]
LnShare_turnover -0.007*** 0.004*** -0.004*** -0.092*** 0.000*** -0.150*** 0.040***
[-19.35] [7.20] [-3.76] [-23.66] [5.53] [-23.30] [7.47]
BTM 0.003* 0.003 -0.006 0.056*** 0.000** 0.070** 0.036*
[2.01] [1.51] [-1.65] [4.30] [2.16] [2.63] [1.69]
LnGDPPerCAP -0.029 -0.024 -0.006 -0.289 0.004* -0.283 -0.052
[-1.44] [-0.51] [-0.09] [-1.00] [1.94] [-0.69] [-0.10]
Loss 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.010** 0.034*** 0.001*** 0.126*** 0.138***
[5.75] [5.30] [2.39] [2.48] [7.56] [5.14] [6.21]
DivYield -0.073*** -0.166*** -0.115 -0.120 -0.003** -0.935** -1.157***
[-3.02] [-4.46] [-1.40] [-0.50] [-2.09] [-2.15] [-3.09]
TPD 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 0.000** -0.043** 0.011
[-0.44] [-1.04] [-0.54] [-0.76] [2.16] [-2.81] [0.52]
MAD -0.004 0.025*** -0.023*** -0.193*** 0.001*** -0.216*** 0.247***
[-1.55] [3.53] [-2.74] [-4.78] [4.01] [-3.73] [3.96]
No of observations 154,433 163,998 156,685 165,720 165,723 144,854 144,854
Adj. R-squared (%) 37.8 6.7 22.8 33.1 21.2 44.2 24.5
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the effects of MiFID on liquidity. The dependent variables are proxies for liquidity. All variables 
are as defined in appendix A. The regressions include (but are not reported here) a constant term. Estimated 
standard errors are doubled-clustered by firm and month and are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
All variables (except LqFac1, LqFac2, LnGDPPerCAP and dummy variable) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. The sample period is from January 2006 to September 2008.The t-statistics are reported in brackets 







    
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
         
        
        
   
 
 
    
     







Panel B: Matched sample
Ln(1+High-
Ln(1+Bid-Ask) Low) Ln(1+Zeros) Ln(1+ILLIQ) Ln(1+CHL) LqFac1 LqFac2
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
EU*MiFID -0.010*** -0.063*** -0.008 -0.102*** -0.003*** -0.178*** -0.078**
[-3.95] [-7.10] [-1.61] [-3.69] [-3.82] [-4.57] [-2.37]
Ln_Mktcap -0.013*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.172*** -0.001*** -0.183*** -0.027***
[-16.68] [-3.66] [-7.36] [-13.31] [-13.44] [-16.94] [-7.12]
LnRet_volat 0.008*** 0.041*** 0.000 0.103*** 0.003*** 0.133*** -0.001
[7.62] [13.90] [0.46] [5.65] [12.20] [10.63] [-0.24]
Ret 0.042*** 0.059*** -0.003 0.698*** 0.005*** 0.594*** -0.027
[11.95] [10.75] [-1.12] [12.41] [12.67] [12.81] [-1.06]
LnShare_turnover -0.008*** 0.003*** -0.000 -0.115*** -0.000*** -0.096*** -0.003
[-24.46] [4.09] [-1.14] [-29.05] [-6.14] [-22.80] [-0.93]
BTM -0.006*** -0.017*** -0.001 -0.064*** -0.001*** -0.087*** -0.012
[-5.49] [-5.42] [-0.66] [-4.14] [-6.30] [-5.46] [-1.04]
LnGDPPerCAP 0.036*** 0.161*** -0.058 0.656*** 0.019*** 0.499*** -0.478
[3.03] [3.76] [-1.62] [5.45] [5.19] [2.91] [-1.14]
Loss 0.005*** 0.043*** 0.007*** -0.004 0.002*** 0.081*** 0.058***
[4.37] [9.81] [4.66] [-0.26] [15.86] [5.06] [3.94]
DivYield -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.030*** -0.000*** -0.025*** -0.009***
[-7.48] [-3.54] [-3.48] [-7.11] [-2.94] [-7.15] [-3.33]
TPD -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.007 -0.000 -0.001 -0.027
[-0.64] [-0.44] [-1.45] [0.50] [-1.08] [-0.02] [-1.31]
MAD -0.015*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.381*** -0.002*** -0.134** -0.061
[-3.97] [-0.27] [-0.56] [-5.10] [-2.96] [-2.69] [-0.88]
No of observations 247,048 273,252 279,808 279,742 246,728 213,994 213,994
Adj. R-squared (%) 34.8 7.7 29.5 36.9 31.0 36.0 30.0
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables are proxies for liquidity. All variables are as defined in appendix A. The regressions
include (but are not reported here) a constant term. Estimated standard errors are doubled-clustered by firm and 
month and are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. All variables (except LqFac1, LqFac2, 
LnGDPPerCAP and dummy variable) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The sample period is from
January 2006 to September 2008. The t-statistics are reported in brackets below their coefficient estimates. ***, 





   
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
    
    
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
    
   
    
       
  
    
 
    





   
 
  
TABLE 6: Falsification tests for the effect of MiFID on price informativeness and liquidity
Panel A Price Informativeness
EU*MiFID -1 EU*MiFID -3 EU*MiFID -6 
D1 D1 D1
EU*MiFID 0.025 0.036 0.050**
[0.71] [1.18] [2.40]
Control Variables YES YES YES
Observations 258,969 258,969 258,969
Adj. R-squared (%) 11.9 11.9 12.0
Month fixed effects YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES
Panel B Liquidity
EU*MiFID -1 EU*MiFID -3 EU*MiFID -6 
Ln(1+Bid-Ask) Ln(1+Bid-Ask) Ln(1+Bid-Ask)
EU*MiFID -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
[-0.56] [-1.11] [-0.57]
Control Variables YES YES YES
Observations 247,048 247,048 247,048
Adj. R-squared (%) 34.8 34.8 34.8
Month fixed effects YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES
NOTES: This table presents the results from falsification tests of regressing delay measure (D1) in 
Panel A and liquidity proxy (Ln(1+Bid-Ask)) in Panel B using hypothetical event dates EU*MiFID -1 , 
EU*MiFID -3 , and EU*MiFID -6 (i.e., one month, three months and six months before the actual
implementation of MiFID regulation) as MiFID implementation dates. The regressions include (but are
not reported here) a constant term and control variables used in model 1 (not reported here for brevity), 
and are estimated by difference-in-differences model with standard errors that are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and double-clustered by month and firm. Matched sample analysis is based on: firm 
size (Ln_Mktcap), log closing price (Ln_Price), log stock return volatility (LnRet_volat), natural 
logarithm of trading volume (LnShare_turnover), book-to-market (BTM), Dividend yield (DivYield),
and returns (Ret). The t-statistics are reported in brackets below their coefficient estimates. Estimated 
standard errors are doubled-clustered by firm and month and are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. All variables (LnGDPPerCAP and dummy variable) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. The t-statistics are reported in brackets below their coefficient estimates. Statistical 













       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       












Table 7: Regulatory quality of the sample countries
Regulatory Strength of Investor Trustworthiness
Countries Quality Protection & Confidence
Austria 1.64 (1.61) 3.70 (4.00) 5.29 (5.32)
Belgium 1.33 (1.41) 7.00 (7.00) 5.31 (5.44)
Bulgaria 0.60 (0.70) 6.00 (6.00) 4.87 (4.58)
Cyprus 1.28 (1.37) 5.85 (5.55)
Czech republic 1.11 (1.16) 5.00 (5.00) 4.98 (5.09)
Denmark 1.80 (1.87) 6.30 (6.30) 5.99 (6.21)
Estonia 1.29 (1.42) 6.00 (6.00) 4.84 (5.11)
Finland 1.60 (1.61) 5.70 (5.70) 5.57 (5.68)
France 1.24 (1.28) 5.30 (5.30) 4.71 (5.66)
Germany 1.57 (1.49) 5.00 (5.00) 6.02 (5.9)
Greece 0.86 (0.88) 3.00 (3.00) 4.33 (4.57)
Hungary 1.21 (1.20) 4.30 (4.30) 5.10 (4.97)
Ireland 1.84 (1.91) 8.30 (8.30) 6.30 (6.06)
Italy 0.98 (0.97) 5.00 (5.70) 4.11 (4.24)
Latvia 1.00 (1.02) 5.70 (5.70) 5.75 (5.44)
Lithuania 0.97 (1.12) 5.30 (5.00) 4.54 (4.88)
Luxembourg 1.67 (1.66) (4.30) 6.75 (5.72)
Malta 1.12 (1.20) 6.44 (6.11)
Netherlands 1.68 (1.78) 4.70 (4.70) 5.92 (5.91)
Norway 1.22 (1.37) 6.70 (6.70) 5.58 (5.69)
Poland 0.73 (0.83) 5.70 (6.00) 4.14 (4.43)
Portugal 1.07 (1.10) 6.00 (6.00) 4.84 (4.96)
Romania 0.46 (0.58) 5.70 (6.00) 4.28 (4.95)
Slovakia 1.13 (1.12) 4.30 (4.70) 6.28 (5.73)
Slovenia 0.80 (0.83) 5.70 (6.30) 5.03 (4.94)
Spain 1.18 (1.25) 5.00 (5.00) 5.27 (5.39)
Sweden 1.44 (1.64) 4.30 (5.70) 5.59 (5.86)
United kingdom 1.84 (1.79) 8.00 (8.00) 6.92 (6.19)
Canada 1.56 (1.65) 8.30 (8.30) 5.97 (5.88)
United States 1.64 (1.53) 8.30 (8.30) 5.82 (5.65)
The table presents the country scores on the four indexes as of 2006 (2008) used to measure the quality
of existing regulation. Higher values imply better regulatory quality. The Regulatory Quality index was
first developed by Kaufmann et al. (2004) and is updated and maintained in the World Bank's
Worldwide Governance Indicators database. The Investor Protection index is part of World Economic
Forum Global Competitiveness index dataset found in the World Bank's Doing Business Reports. The











    
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
    
   
  
   




Table 8: The effect of MiFID on stock price informativeness when existing regulation differs
Regulatory Investor Trustworthiness &
Quality Protection confidence
Column (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: EU Countries only: DelayFac as dependent Variable
MiFID -0.241** -0.766*** 0.993***
[-2.57] [-6.04] [6.59]
QltyReg 0.074*** -0.047*** -0.122***
[2.87] [-5.53] [-6.70]
QltyReg*MiFID 0.215* 0.117*** 0.171***
[2.01] [5.95] [6.15]
Panel B: PSM matched sample: DelayFac as dependent Variable
EU*MiFID -0.749*** -0.907*** -1.597***
[-4.86] [-4.75] [-6.68]
QltyReg -0.236 -0.152*** -0.100**
[-1.69] [-3.89] [-2.15]
QltyReg*EU*MiFID 0.322*** 0.106*** 0.236***
[3.53] [3.94] [6.03]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable DelayFac is the first factor obtained from PCA with the three delay proxies and 
represents the aggregate price informativeness. All variables are as defined in appendix A. All the controls 
used in Table 4 are included here but not reported for brevity. The regressions include (but are not
reported here) a constant term. The sample period is from January 2006 to September 2008. The t-
statistics are reported in brackets below their coefficient estimates. Standard errors are double-clustered by
month and firm and are robust to heteroscedasticity, cross- and serial- correlation. ***, **, and * indicate 










    
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     








Table 9: The effect of MiFID on liquidity when prior regulation differs
Regulatory Investor Trustworthiness & 
Quality Protection confidence
Column (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: EU Countries only: LqFac1 as dependent Variable
MiFID -0.317*** -0.223** -0.501***
[-4.27] [-3.01] [-3.76]
QltyReg 0.031 -0.016 -0.030
[0.32] [-0.93] [-1.11]
QltyReg*MiFID 0.132*** 0.022* 0.071**
[3.61] [1.86] [3.12]
LqFac2 as dependent Variable               
MiFID -0.219** -0.562*** 0.239*
[-2.07] [-4.41] [1.95]
QltyReg 0.785*** 0.157*** -0.091**
[3.76] [4.76] [-2.46]
QltyReg*MiFID 0.076 0.071*** -0.056**
[1.45] [3.26] [-2.59]
Panel B: PSM matched sample: LqFac1 as dependent Variable
EU*MiFID -0.136** -0.105** -0.559***
[-2.58] [2.14] [-6.77]
QltyReg -0.206*** -0.052*** 0.042**
[-3.50] [-4.39] [2.15]
QltyReg*EU*MiFID 0.041 0.007 0.087***
[1.33] [0.98] [6.40]
LqFac2 as dependent Variable
EU*MiFID -0.070*** -0.079*** -0.103***
[-5.42] [-5.41] [-4.48]
QltyReg -0.035* -0.001 -0.005
[-1.95] [-0.16] [-1.31]
QltyReg*EU*MiFID 0.022*** 0.007*** 0.012***
[2.95] [3.27] [3.05]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables LqFac1 and LqFac2 are the first and second factors obtained from PCA 
with the five liquidity proxies and represents the aggregate liquidity measure. All the controls 
used in Table 4 are included here but not reported for brevity. All variables are as defined in 
appendix A. The regressions include a constant term (but not reported here). The sample period is 
from January 2006 to September 2008. The t-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are double-
clustered by month and firm and are robust to heteroscedasticity, cross- and serial- correlation. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (two-
tailed).
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